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Executive Summary 
An array of school choice options now exists across the U.S., including: 
charter schools, voucher and private schools, interdistrict and intradistrict 
choice, and home schooling. These options can be contrasted with local 
public schools, where places are allocated primarily based on residency. 
This paper examines how these options might be funded and the 
challenges associated with including them in funding formulas. The 
primary difficulty is that local public schools and school choice options 
are not easily compared. Public schools and choice options differ in terms 
of: (1) mission; (2) regulations; (3) resources provided (staffing and 
buildings, for examples); and (4) cost of resources provided. They also 
differ in the characteristics of their student bodies. Consequently, deciding 
how much funding to allocate is difficult. The result is that states have 
adopted varied funding approaches to educational choice and created 
varied incentive structures. This study offers examples of such variety 
across the Great Lakes states, surveying each choice form but focusing 
particularly on charter schools, where the evidence is greatest. 
  
Funding formulas are complex in part because they involve funding from 
many agencies, are shaped by various rules, or both. Because simple 
absolute differences in expenditures alone cannot reveal whether funding 
is optimal, a full cost accounting is needed for appropriate allocation of 
funds.  
 
It is recommended that policymakers and funding agencies considering 
school choice funding: 
 
• Find the closest comparison schools and examine the funding they 
receive, taking into account student characteristics, school location, and 
specific services to be provided.  
• Recognize that cost differences are inherent among schools in choice 
programs because the more flexibility a school has, the more it can 
lower its costs.  
• Consider all revenue sources available to choice schools (grants or 
tuition, for example) when calculating funding. 
• Hold all schools accountable and regularly monitor all choice schools 
to ensure that funds are spent directly on education.  
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 Introduction 
This paper reports on funding and financing of school choice 
across the U.S. School choice includes a range of policy reforms, 
including: the promotion of private schools through vouchers and tuition 
tax credits; the introduction of charter schools; the liberalization of public 
school options within and across district boundaries; and deregulation to 
allow home-schooling options. These options may be contrasted with local 
public schools where places are allocated primarily based on residency 
and financing relies heavily on the local tax base. How school choice is 
financed will influence both its prevalence and its effectiveness in 
improving education as an alternative to local public schools. 
This paper examines how funding formulas and financing systems 
encourage or discourage school choice. We begin with a brief overview of 
funding mechanisms and the rationale for incentives. Because school 
choice reforms vary, we consider each variation, but our focus is primarily 
on charter schools. Charters illustrate many key issues that arise in other 
choice forms as well, and they are the most researched option. We draw 
on evidence from across the U.S., although we pay particular attention to 
the Great Lakes states. Our discussion explores the impact of funding 
mechanisms on each of the school choice models. 
Our task here is not to argue for or against greater incentives but 
simply to describe how choice incentives are structured. We adopt the 
position that school choice is worth exploring a priori, but policymakers 
must be aware of all funding issues before deciding whether choice is 
feasible or practical in a particular situation. We do not investigate 
whether public schools are under- or over-funded against any social 
criteria. We focus only on issues of relative funding for school choice 
options and current public school spending. 
We note that many claims regarding incentives for school choice 
reflect political, ideological, or self-interested predispositions rather than a 
dispassionate review of evidence.1 Opponents of school choice argue that 
incentives are too generous and that local public schools are being 
undermined. Proponents argue that school choice options need greater 
incentives so that they can compete with local public schools. It is a 
challenge, however, to give a simple, universal, and uncontested response 
to the question of what constitutes optimal funding and appropriate 
incentives for school choice. In practice, funding and incentives can vary 
extensively. New options are not the same as the traditional public schools 
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they compete with. Often they have different goals and serve different 
student populations, and the extent of such differences varies from state to 
state. Therefore, a raw comparison of per-student funding across choice 
schools and local public schools offers insufficient evidence to make a 
general determination about the strength of financial incentives. The 
correct incentive level for choice options depends on local circumstances.  
 
Funding Systems for Education 
Basic Principles 
Much government funding for education is based on formulas tied 
approximately to student enrollments.2 Student enrollment formulas start 
with an estimate of base foundational aid for regular instruction per child. 
Estimated foundation aid is then typically weighted to account for 
differences in educational costs using a cost-of-education index (at the 
national level, one such index is Taylor and Fowler, 2006).3 Foundation 
aid also varies by grade level to reflect typical differences in class size and 
materials, such as laboratories and theaters. 
The base amount is then augmented by two types of supplementary 
funding. One is student-driven, such as supplements for special education, 
at-risk status, or limited English proficiency. The other is cost-driven, 
reflecting the local economic conditions, particular circumstances, 
historical service patterns, and transportation costs. Duncombe and Yinger 
give a fuller account of how costs might differ according to geography, 
student disadvantage, and school size.4 
In theory, such formulas seem straightforward: classify each 
student and decide on funding amounts per classification. These student-
weighted formulas may be more equitable than allocations based simply 
on historical patterns. In practice, however, formulas are typically 
extremely complicated. Students’ needs vary substantively, as do district 
and school organizations. As an alternative to funding based on per-
student weights, categorical grants may be implemented, for special 
education budgets or for low-income students, for example.5 
Funding allocated using such formulas comes from three public 
sources: federal, state, and local government. Of course, the tax base for 
each differs. In addition, each level of government emphasizes a different 
element of the formulas’s base: student-driven, and cost-driven 
components. For K-12 schooling, the federal government primarily funds 
student-driven or cost-driven components. For example, Title I provides 
basic programs to help low-income or disadvantaged children meet state 
standards, and it also funds educational services for children with 
disabilities. Generally across the U.S., state governments provide 
approximately 45% of education funding, local governments another 45%, 
and the federal government 10%. These proportions, however, vary 
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significantly across states: in Minnesota, for example, the state provides 
almost three-quarters of total funding. 
Formulas to raise revenues for schools may be structured through 
foundation programs, Guaranteed Tax Base programs, or a combination of 
the two.6 And, some states have adopted legislation that significantly 
changes how revenues are raised for education, such as Proposal A in 
Michigan or Proposition 13 in California.7 While this discussion is 
concerned with allocating revenue rather than raising it, it’s worth noting 
that the structure of revenue-raising mechanisms may have some influence 
on school choice. Broadly, the greater the reliance on a single revenue 
source (the state, for example), the more likely it is that school choice 
options will be introduced. If there are multiple jurisdictions funding 
education, then these jurisdictions must all agree—or be mandated—to 
fund the school choice option to the same level as that for students in local 
public schools. The financial implications of school choice may differ 
across jurisdictions, however. For example, local districts incur costs when 
a student transfers in without extra funding, but the transfer is neutral from 
a state’s perspective. Such was the case in Michigan. After Proposal A, 
schools were largely funded by a state sales tax (rather than property 
taxes), and the state was therefore able to unilaterally introduce more 
school choice options. 
In principle, per-student funding need not be allocated only to 
students in traditional public schools. It could be allocated to any charter 
school directly, or to any private school student through a voucher system. 
It could also follow students across districts, or from school to school 
within a district. Even home-schooling parents might receive state funding 
through such mechanisms as tax breaks. If appropriate, per-student 
funding could be modified for each choice option using a cost-driven 
weight. For example, private schools might receive 75% of the funding 
provided for each public school student in the same district. Alternatively, 
contributions from each level of government might be modified: for 
example, charter schools might receive no local funds but more state 
funds. 
The absolute generosity of the funding formula for various choices 
reflects incentives for choice options. Where funding is greater and 
restrictions on access are fewer, incentives for school choice are likely to 
be stronger, and more school choice options will be forthcoming for 
students.8 
In thinking about incentives, it is important to realize that they 
influence choices only relatively—that is, they encourage one option in 
comparison with other options. Alternatives are implicit in any incentive 
structure, which intends to promote certain behaviors and choices. Often 
the alternative to the choice option is the local public school, but it need 
not be. For example, when we think about vouchers as an incentive to 
attend private school, often the assumed alternative is to attend the nearby 
public school. However, comparison of other alternatives may also be 
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relevant; in a particular instance, it might be useful to compare charter 
school incentives with private school incentives. Because schools are 
(loosely) in competition with each other for enrollees, an incentive created 
for one type of school may often be thought of as a disincentive to another 
type. Hence, it may be helpful to think of a continuum of (strong and 
weak) incentives to zero incentives through to (weak and strong) 
disincentives. So, choice schools may receive: more than a sufficient share 
of funding (strong incentive); some funding but less than a comparable 
public school (weak incentive); zero funding (no incentive); or negative 
funding. That is, they may actually lose resources by attracting public 
school students (disincentive). Incentives can be thought of in relative or 
symmetrical terms: a strong incentive for one type of school represents a 
strong disincentive for the other types. 
 
Challenges to Setting Funding Formulas 
In principle, setting a funding formula to permit greater school 
choice appears straightforward. The first step is to calculate how much 
money—for a student with a given set of characteristics—public schools 
spend or need to meet the state’s education requirements (these are not 
necessarily the same). The second step is to make this amount available to 
any school, public or private. This would provide “equal incentives” for 
each type of school to serve students with a given set of characteristics, 
maximizing students’ available choices. 
However, fundamental trade-offs are often involved in 
implementation of funding formulas. For example, a formula may be 
designated “cost-plus,” which requires schools to submit receipts and then 
reimburses their expenditures up to a fixed maximum. This case limits the 
possibility that a school will receive surpluses (or profits), but the school 
has no incentive to cut costs below the designated maximum. 
Alternatively, the formula may be designed as “fixed price,” which 
provides schools with a fixed amount of funding regardless of what they 
actually spend. The surplus goes as “profit” to the owner/manager of the 
school. In “fixed-price” cases, schools that are very efficient may reap 
very large profits—an economic imperative that cannot be eliminated. 
Once a school (or any enterprise) is allocated a fixed budget, it will seek 
ways to reduce costs and generate surplus (or profits). For example, Miron 
has described the cost-saving strategies used by Education Management 
Organizations.9 
Nor are these the only potential complications. There are several 
practical challenges to implementing a funding formula from its first step: 
identifying how much is being spent or should be spent. To begin, it is 
necessary to find a comparable local public school against which to 
compare a choice school. This comparison should be based on factors that 
influence costs, such as location, grade level, school size, and student 
characteristics. However, such comparison simply may not be possible: 
Funding Formulas, School Choice, and Inherent Incentives 
     
               5 of 21 
 
 
since one of the goals of school choice is to introduce educational options 
that did not previously exist, there may not be a comparable public school. 
In such cases, costs have to be calculated from a direct “bottom-up” 
assessment of a school’s every need. Such assessment may be very 
expensive for a district to perform on a case-by-case basis. 
Moreover, even if the goals of public and choice schools are the 
same, their costs may differ for several reasons. First, the regulations for 
choice schools may differ. For example, a private school may be exempt 
from collective bargaining rules for teachers, allowing it to pay teachers 
less (or hire teachers with different qualifications or skills). A looser set of 
regulations will give a school more freedom to make choices that may 
either increase efficiency or reduce costs. Second, various schools may 
differ substantively in teaching staff and facilities. Choice schools may be 
able to recruit teachers from a wider labor market than local public 
schools; they may be able to reduce salaries by hiring less experienced 
teachers or (in the case of religious schools) teachers who regard 
education as a vocation rather than an occupation. Local public schools, 
however, may have an advantage in terms of facilities, since they have 
access to public buildings and below-market rent; private or choice 
schools, on the other hand, may have to pay full market rent for any spaces 
they buy or lease. 
Observable differences may also be evident in students. For 
example, choice schools may offer only elementary education, or may 
enroll fewer students with special educational needs. In cases where a 
school enrolls only students with characteristics associated with below-
average cost, it is not efficient for it to be allocated average funding. When 
such characteristics can be observed, then the funding formula can account 
for them and provide each school with appropriately adjusted amounts. 
Ideally, choice schools should receive regular per-pupil funding for 
students with disabilities according to an independent cost estimate of 
required services for specific conditions (such as an Individualized 
Education Program). Some states (Pennsylvania, for example) offer extra 
incentives for charter schools to enroll students with disabilities, although 
they are typically for mild or moderate disabilities, which tend to be less 
costly to educate. 
Students, however, may differ in ways that are hard to observe. For 
example, a choice school may recruit students whose families are 
expressly committed to the mission of the school. These students may be 
“easier to teach” and so require fewer resources (for such services as 
remedial education or school counseling). Families may be required to 
contribute resources to the school. Such invisible factors, though 
influential, cannot be incorporated into any choice funding formula. 
Funding considerations also must include the effects of new 
options on existing enrollment patterns, which may potentially be large 
and with unpredicted budget consequences. For example, because they are 
not geographically limited, cyber-charter schools may grow to enormous 
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size, fast outstripping their projected budget needs. Another possibility is 
found in the fact that some families may be sending their children to 
private school because of dissatisfaction with the local public school. If a 
high-quality charter school opens, parents may choose to enroll their 
children there, so that their education becomes a public expense rather 
than a private one. A direct subsidy to a private school would have the 
same effect, so that cost for previously enrolled students would no longer 
be paid by their families, but by taxpayers. In short, new school choice 
funding formulas could create government educational obligations for 
millions of families who would otherwise have received no, or very 
limited, government funds. Creating school choice options has far-
reaching ramifications for private as well as public schools, whose costs 
might also change significantly in the complex matrix of choice. 
Finally, choice schools may have streams of revenue in addition to 
government subsidies. Therefore, even if an appropriate comparison with 
a local public school is possible and funding determined, it is not certain 
that public taxes should provide full funding. For example, private schools 
charge fees to parents and may receive donations; similarly, charter 
schools may obtain grants from philanthropic agencies. Even when a 
private school accepts vouchers, it may continue to impose fees. Although 
policymakers may try to prevent such “topping-up,” in practice it will be 
very difficult to enforce any rule against it. For example, schools might 
claim that fees are for services over and above regular instruction. In 
addition, such fees may be politically sensitive because a school may use 
them to restrict access to certain student groups. Yet, to withhold funding 
from choice schools because they have access to funding from other 
sources would discourage these schools from diversifying their revenues.10 
 
 
Funding Systems for Charter Schools 
Funding Mechanisms 
Charter schools—publicly funded schools run by independent 
agencies and enterprises—illustrate the many challenges associated with 
school choice funding. Functioning under a contract with a state or district 
authority, charters are often subject to similar, but slightly looser, 
regulations as local public schools. Some are former public or private 
schools which have converted to charter status; others are run by private, 
for-profit organizations called Educational Management Organizations 
(EMOs). 
As is true in principle generally, devising a funding system for 
charter schools should be a straightforward task. It might seem that charter 
schools should receive the same amount of per-student funding as local 
public schools, from the same sources (federal, state, and local), and in the 
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same proportions.11 Yet, as noted above, there are several practical 
challenges. 
For each state in the Great Lakes region, Table 1 describes the 
source of funding and the financing system for charter schools and how 
funds are allocated to them.  
 
Table 1: Financing system for charter schools: Great Lakes States 
State Funding 
from 
System of financing 
 
Illinois  School 
district 
Negotiated with sponsor school district and specified 
in charter, but 75%-125% of per-capita student 
tuition multiplied by the number of students residing 
in the district enrolled in the charter school. 
Indiana  State Charter schools receive 100% of the per-pupil 
funding that traditional schools receive. 
 
Michigan  Charter 
authorizing 
body 
100% of state and school district operations funding 
follows students, based on average school district 
per-pupil revenue, not to exceed a certain amount 
that rises from year to year based on state aid 
formula. 
Minnesota  State State portion of operations funding follows students, 
based on average state per-pupil revenue. School 
district portion of operations funding does not follow 
students. 
New York  School 
district 
School districts must provide 100% of a state-
specified per-pupil funding calculation, although this 
amount may be reduced based on an agreement 
between the school and the charter authorizer. 
Ohio  
 
State A statewide base cost formula with adjustments, 
which includes a county-level cost of doing business 
factor. 
 
Pennsylvania  School 
district 
Funding follows students, based on average school 
district per-pupil budgeted expenditure of the 
previous year. For regional charter schools, funds 
come from the school district of a student's 
residence. Charter schools receive extra funding for 
special needs students. 
Wisconsin  School 
district or 
state 
Funding for a charter school authorized by a city, 
university or technical college is the sum of per pupil 
funding in the previous school year plus any revenue 
increase per pupil in the current school year. Funding 
for a charter school authorized by a local school 
board is determined by negotiation between the two 
parties. 
Source: ECS Charter School Profiles (www.ecs.org), 2006 information. 
 
Even within this region, funding sources vary significantly. Some 
charters are funded by school districts (Illinois and Minnesota, for 
example), while others are funded by states (Indiana and Ohio, for 
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example). These differences may reflect student demography. If charter 
schools enroll students from across school districts, it may be more 
appropriate to fund them at the state level rather than the district level. 
Generally, funding follows students, although the relationship varies 
across states and most states adjust their public school funding amounts. 
For example, in New York, there is some flexibility on charter school 
funds; in Wisconsin, the amounts may depend on which agency authorizes 
the charter school. Several key factors influence such adjustments. 
First, charter schools often receive funds from non-government 
sources, including community groups and non-profit charities.12 These 
agencies may provide in-kind funds rather than money, so that their 
contributions do not appear in the school’s formal accounting system. 
Based on a study of 10 charter schools in New York City in 2000-2001, 
Ascher et al. found a diverse array of supports for charter schools. Schools 
or district agencies provided such services as workshops. Charter school 
organizations assisted with information, networking, technical assistance, 
and political consultation.13 Charter school authorizers provided legal 
assistance and information on accountability and operations. Non-profit 
organizations provided funds for development. Finally, charter schools 
allied with non-profit partners to provide instructional and operational 
services. Collectively, these supports may be a significant supplement to 
the funds from government agencies.14 The key issue for funding charter 
schools is whether to subtract public funding to offset this additional 
outside funding or to allow charters full funding despite their outside 
funding, thereby allowing them to spend more than the local public 
school. The decision is a trade-off: either charter schools are penalized for 
successful external fund-raising, or they are allowed greater funding than 
local public schools. 
Second, charter schools may be regulated differently than local 
public schools. Any schools operating in highly regulated systems will 
have higher costs: they must satisfy particular accountability rules and 
standards, including rules that may restrict their spending decisions (as 
when they must hire more expensive, certified teachers). Regulations can 
be structured either to support charter schools or to undermine them. For 
example, many states require school districts to provide in-kind services to 
charter schools, including transportation, classroom and library materials, 
extracurricular activities, personnel services, and school testing.15 
Transportation, in particular, is a significant fraction of total spending in 
school districts. Thus, it can be argued that charter schools that do not 
have to provide those services should receive less funding than regular 
public schools; when they receive full funding, they have a clear financial 
advantage.  
However, charter schools typically also have short-term contracts 
with authorizing agencies (generally three or five years). If the agency 
deems that the contract has not been satisfied, the charter school may be 
closed. This threat imposes a risk on the charter school that is typically not 
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imposed on public schools. In turn, risk imposes costs: teachers must be 
paid more to offset the higher probability of job loss; entrepreneurs will 
demand a higher profit or surplus to offset the possibility that the school 
may be prematurely closed. Yet, accountability mandates also apply to 
public schools: under No Child Left Behind, public schools failing to 
make Adequate Yearly Progress face sanctions that include possible 
closure. Therefore, the costs of a closure risk are similar across public and 
choice schools. 
While external factors, such as whether the school operates in a 
low- or high-cost market, affect expenses, regulatory differences also can 
obviously produce cost differences between charter schools and local 
public schools.16 Table 2 shows some regulations for charter schools in the 
Great Lakes states, indicating their variety. 
 
Table 2: Charter School Regulations 
 School district 
collective bargaining 
agreements  
Facilities funds or other 
facilities assistance 
Start-up or 
planning 
grants 
Illinois  No Yes, for use of school 
buildings 
Yes, based on 
student 
enrollment 
Indiana  Yes, but may seek 
waivers 
Yes, financing from local 
public improvement 
bond bank 
No 
Michigan  Yes, if local school 
board charters 
No No 
Minnesota  No Yes, through state grants 
per student 
Yes, for two 
years at 
$50,000 or per 
student 
enrollment 
New York  Yes, if conversion 
charter 
Yes, for use of vacant 
state buildings 
No 
Ohio  
 
Yes, if conversion 
charter 
Yes, through loans under 
the Facilities Loan 
Guarantee Program 
Yes, at 
$50,000 
unless school 
receives 
federal grant 
Pennsylvania  No Yes, for use of buildings 
approved by the state 
department of education 
Yes 
Wisconsin  Yes, if charter school is 
a district school 
No No 
Source: ECS Charter School Profiles (www.ecs.org) 
 
The first column of Table 2 indicates whether charters must adhere 
to the local school district's collective bargaining agreement and hire 
teachers comparable to those in the local public school. Other personnel 
regulations might involve charters’ requirements in relation to state 
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retirement pension payments, or costs for in-service training or 
professional development. Because teacher salaries and benefits constitute 
a large part of the school budget, such regulations could result in 
significant cost differences between charters and public schools. In a 
number of states, no charter has to adhere to the local collective 
bargaining agreement (Illinois, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, for 
example); in other states, only conversion charter schools must adhere to 
collective bargaining agreements (New York and Ohio, for example). 
Charter schools with greater flexibility on employment contracts might be 
able to save more than public schools on personnel. 
The second column of Table 2 indicates which states in the Great 
Lakes states provide funds for facilities, another key area of cost 
differences.17 Several researchers have identified shortfalls in funding for 
charter schools’ facilities, in part because they do not have access to 
municipal bonds and because they cannot find facilities.18 As Table 2 
shows, state funding for charter facilities varies, and most often it is less 
than that available for local public schools.  
A third cost differential area is charters’ initial start-up costs.19 
Specifically, charter schools must secure a facility, purchase instructional 
materials, design a curriculum, hire educators, administrators, and possibly 
legal and financial experts, and advertise their services before opening.20 
For many of these services, public schools already have an operating 
procedure. As the final column of Table 2 shows, only a few states 
provide start-up grants to help charters develop their procedures.21 
Additionally, some charter schools may lack the administrative staff 
needed to take advantage of federal and state grants to offset development 
costs.22 
Such differences in sources and regulations will lead to different 
organizational forms. For example, if charter schools must meet certain 
educational standards to satisfy their contracts, they may under-invest in 
resources, such as libraries, not clearly linked directly to achievement.23 
Alternatively, if charter schools must spend more on facilities and so have 
less money for staffing, they may hire less experienced or qualified 
teachers.24 Most importantly, charter schools may be less likely to provide 
education for high-need populations.25 As Miron and Nelson found, in 
Michigan many charter schools “specialize in low-cost, basic elementary 
education, with few students requiring special education services.”26 This 
decision is expressly motivated by incentives in the funding formula. 
These issues are pertinent not only across public and charter 
schools, but also within the charter school sector. Perhaps the most notable 
feature of Table 2 is the significant variation in regulations across states. 
Charter schools are not uniform and so do not all incur the same costs. 
Using national data from 1999-2000, Bodine et al. have found significant 
differences among charter schools in teacher quality, student-staff ratios, 
length of the school day, and propensity to unionize.27 An analysis of the 
1999-2000 Schools and Staffing Survey by Fuller et al. revealed that 
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conversion charter schools, which are more like traditional public schools, 
have greater access to public funding than do start-up charter schools.28 As 
a result, conversion charter schools, on average, offer higher teacher 
salaries and employ more credentialed teachers and fewer part-time 
teachers. Miron found that Education Management Organizations (EMOs) 
may be better prepared to access capital funds than other types of charter 
schools.29  
All of these differences may be attributable to the regulations 
across states, the types of students served, and the charter school’s origin 
(conversion versus start-up school). Therefore, even if a district believes 
that it has funded one charter school optimally, the funding amount may 
not apply appropriately to other charter schools.30 
 
Evidence on optimal funding for charter schools 
We now turn to the evidence on whether charter schools—at least 
on average—are funded comparably to public schools. 
Nationally, studies find that charter schools are funded at levels 
slightly below those for local public schools.31 These studies typically 
look only at public funding, however, not total funding from all sources. 
Moreover, this overall conclusion may mask within-state differences. For 
New York, Huerta and d’Entremont reported that charter schools are 
under-funded relative to local public schools. However, the difference is 
probably small: Jacobowitz and Gyurko calculated that the disparity may 
be only 5%-10% of total public funding.32 For Michigan, Miron and 
Nelson reported that although charter schools do receive less public 
funding, the types of students served by Michigan charters more than 
compensates for the difference.33 For Indiana, Plucker et al. found no 
significant differences in how charter schools allocate resources.34 The 
situation appears significantly different in Dayton, Ohio, where Hassel et 
al. studied the 2001-02 finances of ten community or charter schools. 
There, after adjusting for some enrollment and district characteristics, they 
found that the charters received over 25% less funding than local public 
schools.35 And finally, in Philadelphia, charter school costs are higher, 
which may perhaps be because of contracts with Educational Management 
Organizations.36 
  
Funding and Incentives for Other Forms of School Choice 
Many of the financing issues raised above in relation to charter 
schools are relevant to any form of school choice. Each form of school 
choice is different, however, and therefore this section highlights 
financing issues for three other choice models: private schools made 
available through voucher or tuition tax credits; interdistrict school choice; 
and home schooling. 
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Vouchers and Private schooling 
School choice systems may promote private schooling. One such 
approach is to provide students with vouchers that provide funding 
directly to whichever school enrolls a student. As of 2007, there are four 
formal, publicly funded voucher programs operating across the U.S.: in 
Milwaukee, Wis.; Cleveland, Ohio; Florida; and Washington, D.C. 
In 1990, Milwaukee introduced the nation’s first voucher program: 
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. The program was initially 
limited to low-income families comprising no more than 1% of 
Milwaukee Public School students, but the cap was subsequently lifted. 
Initially only non-religious schools could participate in the program, but 
this restriction, too, was lifted in 1998. By 2004, more than 100 schools 
and 12,800 students were enrolled in the program. The voucher was 
initially $2,446 in 1990; in 2004, it had reached $5,882. In comparison, 
per-pupil funding for public schools across the state of Wisconsin was 
$8,600 (including transportation).  
The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program was introduced 
in 1995. Children residing in the Cleveland Municipal School District 
received vouchers allowing them to attend any participating private 
school, with low-income families given preference. Again, the voucher 
amount was significantly below per-pupil funding in the local school 
district: for low-income families, the voucher amount was $2,250; for 
families with incomes above 200% of the poverty line, the amount was 
$1,875. Across Ohio, average per-student spending was $8,100.  
The Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program was established in 
1999: schools that receive a grade of F for two out of four years must 
either allow their students to move to another public school or provide 
them with a voucher to attend a private school. The voucher’s value is up 
to $4,500 in comparison to public school funding of $6,300. Finally, the 
D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program, introduced in 2004, was the first 
federal government initiative to fund K-12 education for low-income 
families residing in the DC public school district. The Washington 
voucher amount is $7,500 in comparison to public school funding of 
$12,100. 
These voucher programs are clearly new incentives for private 
schools, since they provide public funds for schools that would otherwise 
have none. However, in each program the value of the voucher is far less 
than the average per-pupil expenditure in the local school district (even if 
transportation costs are subtracted). Therefore, it is unlikely that these 
programs will expand school choice options significantly. These amounts 
simply are not a large incentive to attract existing private schools or to 
generate new ones. Of course, lesser voucher amounts may nevertheless 
be optimal from the governmental perspective. Providing vouchers to all 
private school students will inevitably benefit some families who would 
otherwise have paid for private schooling themselves; for these families, 
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vouchers act as a straight subsidy and neither change behavior nor 
encourage an expanded set of school choice options. Thus, voucher 
funding requires a trade-off: without sufficient funding, schools will not 
accept vouchers; however, if the funding is too generous, too many 
families will receive windfall subsidies for going to private school. A low-
value voucher may therefore expand school choice slightly, without 
generating a large fiscal deficit. 
In some respects, funding for special education operates as a 
voucher system: student need is identified, and funding for it may be 
portable across public and private institutions. Individual evaluations 
determine that a student has particular needs (specified in an 
Individualized Education Plan); funds for services follow the child, so 
families may choose any institution capable of providing necessary 
services. The funding system in this case should be fairly straightforward. 
However, financial incentives do influence identification and placement 
rates: greater amounts of funding per child are associated with higher 
placement rates.37 In most states, private institutions play only a very 
limited role in special education, although Florida has an explicit voucher 
program. Since 2001, its McKay program has been providing vouchers to 
children with disabilities so that they can attend private schools. In 2006-
2007, total funding was $119 million across 18,900 students. But the 
values of the vouchers range from about $5,000 to $21,900, depending on 
the child’s disabilities, with an average amount of $7,200. Thus, there is 
considerable variation in the resources a school might be allocated for 
each student.38 
Tax codes offer another way to encourage private school choice. 
Specifically, states can provide tax exemptions either for private schools 
or for families’ expenses for educational items. Such exemptions may be 
offered through taxable status, tax deductions or tax credits.39 For 
example, private schools are considered not-for-profit and therefore do not 
have to pay taxes; they may also benefit from using church spaces, which 
provides a number of other tax incentives.  
A tax policy that has recently grown more popular is the allowance 
of tuition tax credits, which permit families to subtract a portion of private 
school tuition costs from the amount of taxes they owe. 40 (Tax deductions 
work differently, allowing families to deduct some private schools costs 
from the amount of their taxable income.) Since 1997, six states have 
enacted tuition tax credits for education (Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, 
Minnesota, and Pennsylvania). Thus far, the credit amounts are often 
small (typically less than $1,000). Nevertheless, they are another way in 
which the government may finance alternative school choices. 
 
Home schooling 
Home schooling is growing in popularity.41 As is true for other 
school options, the rate of home schooling varies significantly across 
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states: as of 2005, home-schooling enrollments were estimated at 1,000 in 
Michigan (less than 0.1% of public school enrollment); 14,600 in 
Minnesota (1.7%); 23,900 in Pennsylvania (1.3%); and 21,300 in 
Wisconsin (2.4%). Some of this variation undoubtedly reflects the 
incentives embedded in state and district policies. 
Generally, home-schooling families receive no public funding for 
their children’s education, so at first they may appear at a considerable 
financial disadvantage compared to families choosing other options. 
However, home schoolers are allowed to use public school resources: in 
fact, they are entitled to use public school resources on a part-time or 
temporary basis, and legally they cannot be denied access to the public 
school system. Although data is sparse, it is believed that many home 
schoolers do use public school resources, either temporarily or part-time. 
Such use is most probably for expensive programs, such as sciences, and 
for physical education (which requires large spaces). Moreover, some 
home schoolers enroll in cyber-charter schools, which means they receive 
direct support from the district or state. In additions, some states allow 
home-schooling families to claim increased tax credits and tax deductions. 
Whether these forms of support are sufficient to allow home-schooling 
families to offer adequate education is unknown; no research exists on the 
optimal resources needed for home schooling.  
As with other choice forms, the incentive to home school also 
depends on regulations that home-schooling families must satisfy: the 
more regulations, the higher the cost and the less desirable the option. 
Home-schooling regulations vary from state to state but may include 
notification to districts of the intent to home school; submission of plans 
for educating their children; and test-taking. Still, these are far less 
burdensome that the regulations faced by public schools, charter schools, 
or private schools. Moreover, compliance with home-schooling 
regulations is unverified, and enforcement is often weak. In terms of 
regulations, then, home schooling enjoys a greater incentive than choice or 
traditional public schools. 
Calculating the optimal amount of public funding needed for home 
schooling is difficult, however, because resources for home schooling are 
very different from those for schools. For example, one of the parents 
(typically the mother) instructs the children, which means that parent does 
not work outside the home. Hence, the full “opportunity cost” for home-
schooling families includes not only the loss of public school resources 
but also the parent’s lost income. Estimating the lost income is difficult. 
While the parent’s predicted earnings can be reasonably calculated, it 
would also be necessary to calculate the intrinsic rewards of teaching 
one’s children (as opposed to working in an office, for example). Home-
schooling parents may also acquire other resources at different prices than 
schools pay. For example, many home-schooling families draw on 
community resources, such as libraries and churches, for learning 
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materials and curricula. As yet, no rigorous estimate of home-schooling 
costs to the state has been calculated. 
A related form of home-based education is cyber schooling. In 
most states, cyber schools are funded just like charter schools, although 
they are perhaps closer to home schooling. Importantly, cyber schools 
have operating costs that are substantially different from regular schools.42 
They do not, for example, incur transportation costs, although they often 
allocate students a laptop computer for home use.  
As for other choice options, it is important to compare costs for 
cyber schools against costs for local public schools. One approach to 
financing cyber schools is to set funding as a percentage of regular 
funding and then progressively manipulate the percentage. In California, 
for examples, the cyber charter law initially set funding at 90% of that for 
regular schools, then later reduced the percentage to 70%. Subsequent 
revisions were tied to expenditures on “certified staff salaries and 
benefits” as well as on “instruction-related items.” Home school cyber 
charters were expected to progress to a point where they spent at least 
50% of their revenues on certified staff and salaries; nearly half of them 
failed to meet this threshold.  
However, an additional funding issue in cyber schools is that they 
may have volatile enrollments that can create an insupportable funding 
commitment. An illustrative case is that of Western Pennsylvania Cyber 
Charter School. This school expanded enrollments to more than 1,000 
within a few years of opening, but local school districts were unwilling to 
remit the per-pupil funds based on these enrollment claims, in part because 
the districts could not be certain that the students were part of their 
populations. Such situations are exacerbated when states have weak 
accountability systems for cyber schools.  
 
Interdistrict and intradistrict school choice  
Finally, interdistrict and intradistrict school choice expands 
educational options for students while keeping them in traditional school 
systems. For example, in 1996 Michigan adopted an interdistrict choice 
program (Schools of Choice) that allows students to choose public schools 
outside their home district. School districts can determine whether to 
accept nonresident students, but they cannot prohibit their students from 
choosing a school in an alternative district. Approximately 80,000 students 
across the state are involved in the program.43 Intradistrict, or “open 
enrollment,” programs that allow students to choose among schools within 
a district are also becoming more common. For example, the Chicago 
Public School district offers students considerable choice. 
It may be relatively easy to develop funding formulas for inter- and 
intradistrict choice. Every year, many thousands of students transfer across 
districts, with the fiscal consequences fairly easily absorbed.44 When 
education is funded at the local level, however, transfers can generate a 
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significant strain on the local tax base if sufficient funds don’t follow 
students from district to district. Also, the amount of funding per school 
within a district may vary (for magnet schools or remedial schools, for 
example). Such funding differences may be attributable to the factors 
considered above: differences in student populations, the use of particular 
resources, the prices of those resources, the availability of alternative 
funding sources (federal funding for magnet schools, for example), and 
services these schools might provide (transportation, for example). At the 
same time, intradistrict schools share the same administrative, managerial, 
and governance structures. Therefore, the absolute differences in costs 
may be smaller than for other forms of school choice. 
 
Conclusion 
Appropriate financial incentives are those that reward desirable 
outcomes and penalize undesirable outcomes. This is as true for education 
and school choice as for any other government service. Designing an 
incentive system, then, involves as a first essential step making decisions 
about which school choice reforms are desirable and which are not. Such 
decisions are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the focus here has 
been to highlight various issues involved in designing funding formulas 
and financing mechanisms, given the assumption that incentives can be 
created to promote school choice.  
While the issues are many, the central question is: Do choice 
schools receive enough public resources compared to traditional public 
schools to give them real incentive to offer students places? Simply, if the 
incentives are strong enough, more types of schools will emerge to offer 
more places. 
Based on this review of the evidence we make the following 
recommendations for policymakers or funding agencies. As we show 
below, these recommendations may not always cohere with each other, 
creating a set of trade-offs. 
 
• When funding school choice options, find the closest comparison 
school and examine the amount of resource that school receives. These 
comparisons should be made based on the characteristics of the 
students served, the location of the school, and the specific services that 
are being provided by the new school choice options.  
• Recognize that school choice options will have different costs relative 
to traditional public schools. Costs also vary among various choice 
options (charter schools compared to home schooling, for example). 
Such variation will exist even within a state. Policymakers must 
appreciate these differences and consider the implications for funding 
allocations. 
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The challenge is to try to fund school choice options equitably 
while recognizing real cost differentials. One approach is to directly 
investigate specific resources each school type requires and estimating 
their costing. Another is to examine the schools’ year-end balances to see 
whether the choice incentives appear too strong or too weak. A third 
approach is to expand school choice options incrementally, progressively 
strengthening incentives to encourage more options and optimal choice 
conditions.  
 
Other recommendations include: 
 
• Take into account the full set of revenues that school choice options 
may have available.  
• Consider the opportunity costs associated with school choice. Instead 
of simply investigating funding parity, examine the fiscal consequences 
of school choice.  
• Mandate accountability and regularly monitor all forms of school 
choice (as well as traditional public schools).  
 
A related set of recommendations are relevant for journalists, 
researchers and analysts who wish to compare funding across diverse 
forms of school choice: 
 
• Realize that funding formulas are complex, with funding from many 
agencies and according to various rules.  
• Do not relay on absolute differences in expenditures to determine 
whether choice schools are adequately funded. A full cost accounting is 
needed to see where choice schools may be spending more or less than 
regular public schools.  
• Consider that choice schools will have lower unit costs if they do not 
offer such services as transportation and special education, but may 
have higher costs if they have no capital for facilities.  
• Remember that schools with more flexibility will have lower unit costs. 
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